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DECEPTION, DECISIONS, AND 
INVESTOR EDUCATION 
Jayne W. Barnard 
Tens of millions of dollars each year are spent on investor education. Because older 
adults (those aged sixty and older) are disproportionately victims of investment fraud 
schemes, many educational programs are targeted at them. In this Article, Professor 
Barnard questions the effectiveness of these programs. Drawing on recent studies 
from marketing scholars, neurobiologists, social psychologists, and behavioral 
economists examining the ways in which older adults process information and make 
decisions, she offers a model of fraud victimization (the "deception/decision cycle") 
that explains why older adults are often vulnerable to investment fraud schemes. She 
then suggests that many of the factors that contribute to fraud victimization are 
unlikely to be influenced by fraud prevention education. She also recommends 
alternative uses for the money now spent on fraud prevention education that would 
better achieve the goal of protecting older investors. 
Professor Jayne Barnard is the Cutler Professor of Law and the Kelly Professor for 
Teaching Excellence at William & Mary Law School. She specializes in the fields of 
corporations, white collar crime, and securities regulation. Prior to joining the faculty 
at William & Mary, Professor Barnard was a partner at the Chicago office of Jenner & 
Block. Professor Barnard currently serves on the National Adjudicatory Council of 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FlNRA), and is a member of the Ameri-
can Law Institute. 
She acknowledges the excellent work of William & Mary students Kimberly Wilson, 
Kate Celender, Nathan Hagler, and Maire Corcorcan, each of whom contributed re-
search and ideas to this project. She also thanks the participants at the 2008 Law & 
Society Association annual meeting, at which an early draft of this project was pre-
sented. Several colleagues at the William & Mary Law School contributed useful 
thoughts and suggestions. Professor Barnard thanks John Tucker for his skeptical 
comments and editorial suggestions. 
HeinOnline -- 17 Elder L.J. 202 2009
202 The Elder Law journal VOLUME 17 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction ...................................................................................... 202 
II. Schemers and Their Victims ........................................................... 205 
III. Older Adults' Receptivity to Promotional Messages .................. 211 
IV. Risk Seeking in Older Adults ......................................................... 219 
V. Other Factors Predisposing Older Adults to Believe 
Fraudulent Claims ........................................................................... 223 
VI. Fraud Prevention Education and Its Critics ................................. 225 
VII. Alternative Strategies ....................................................................... 234 
VIII. Conclusion ....................................................................................... 237 
I. Introduction 
Fraud schemes aimed at elderly investors are a 
commonplace American tragedy. Year after year, and in state after 
state, clever con artists extract hundreds of millions of dollars from 
old people by enticing them into fraudulent investment schemes. 
Some of these investors are victims of traditional brokers or in-
vestment advisers who churn their accounts or misappropriate their 
funds. 1 This Article, however, focuses on different types of schemes: 
high-pressure telemarketing campaigns, "free lunch" seminars, Web 
sites promoting illusory securities, sales of products deliberately de-
signed to look like they are not securities but instead are charitable 
contributions or probate-avoidance devices, and other inventive narr-
ative structures that are created for the sole purpose of separating in-
vestors from their money.2 
For years, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
made these types of schemes a focus of its enforcement efforts. In-
deed, pursuit of "small-time" Ponzi schemers is alleged to have di-
verted the SEC enforcement staff from investigating some of the larg-
1. See, e.g., SEC v. Gross, SEC Litig. Release No. 20732, 2008 SEC LEXIS 2116 
(Sept. 22, 2008) (claiming defendant collected $700,000 in commissions and fees 
while his elderly customers suffered more than $2.7 million in losses); SEC v. 
Dawson, SEC Litig. Release No. 20321, 2007 SEC LEXIS 2334 (Oct. 2, 2007) (detail-
ing allegations that investment advisers had misappropriated more than $2 million 
of clients' funds); SEC v. Ucherek, SEC Litig. Release No. 17618, 2002 SEC LEXIS 
1816 Guly 16, 2002) (detailing allegations that a broker had misappropriated $3 
million from his elderly clients by selling fictitious investments and pocketing the 
proceeds). 
2. See infra Part II. 
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er, systemic problems in the mortgage-backed securities market, the 
banking industry generally, credit default swaps, the insurance indus-
try, and credit rating agencies. 
Alongside its enforcement initiatives, the SEC has allocated sig-
nificant resources to the task of fraud prevention education, frequent-
ly focusing specifically on schemes aimed at elderly investors.3 Do-
zens of other organizations have joined in this effort, including state 
regulators and brokerage firms. Though the financial details of these 
programs are not easily available, I estimate that these groups collec-
tively spend at least $10 million annually to fund fraud prevention 
education aimed at older adults.' 
This Article asks whether that money is well-spent. Is an educa-
tional message, even a well-designed educational message, likely to 
insulate elderly investors from becoming fraud victims? Or do elderly 
investors exhibit certain characteristics that inhibit their ability to ab-
sorb the educational message? I suggest that several characteristics of 
older adults, including cognitive deficits, impulsiveness in decision 
making, a "truth bias" causing them to believe what they are told by 
someone who appears to be authoritative, a longing for intimacy, and 
an irrational but powerful excitation at the thought of ending up poor 
and dependent on their children frustrate the good intentions of fraud 
prevention education. By drawing together recent research into the 
decision-making styles of older adults, we can see why (1) they are 
3. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, For Seniors, http://www. 
sec.gov /investor/seniors.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2009); see also Protecting Senior 
Citizens from Investment Fraud: Hearing Before S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, llOth Cong. 
9 (2007) [hereinafter Protecting Senior Citizens] (statement of Christopher Cox, 
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) (noting that more than 50,000 
seniors have attended fraud prevention programs sponsored by the SEC). 
4. One of the primary sources of fraud prevention education is the large 
brokerage firms that were party to the settlement with New York Attorney Gener-
al Eliot Spitzer and the SEC in 2003. Under the terms of that settlement, more than 
$80 million was earmarked by the brokerage firms for investor education. See 
Press Release, SEC, Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Ac-
tions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking, 
Apr. 28, 2003, http:/ /www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. According to the 
SEC, $52.5 million of thls amount was to be put into an Investor Education Fund 
that "will develop and support programs designed to equip investors with the 
knowledge and skills necessary to make informed decisions." Id. The remaining 
$27.5 million "will be paid to state securities regulators and will be used by them 
for investor education purposes." Id. 
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disproportionately victims of fraud and (2) educational messages 
aimed at older adults are likely to fail. 
This diagnosis rests on a wide range of research into the act of 
making decisions, including investment decisions. We now know 
quite a bit about the ways in which older adults process information 
and how they respond to promotional messages. We also are begin-
ning to understand that many older adults, other cognitive deficits 
aside, may lose their capacity to appreciate risk. We also have identi-
fied some of the social factors that may influence "scamming vulnera-
bility." 
Several threads of scholarship, such as marketing studies, neu-
roscience studies, and psychological studies of fraud victims, together 
with studies in finance and behavioral economics may help answer 
the question, "Can elderly investors be educated to avoid securities 
fraud, or is their intellectual understanding of the risk of fraud likely 
to be overtaken by other impulses?" In examining this question and 
proposing an answer, I will expand upon the existing literature by in-
troducing what I call the "deception/decision cycle." This construct 
illustrates the many factors that can lead to older investors' victimiza-
tion. 
This Article will unfold as follows: In Part II, I will sketch out 
what we know about fraud schemes aimed at older investors, largely 
to emphasize the kinds of sales techniques and message strategies that 
have been successful with this population. In Part III, I will examine 
recent scholarship about information processing by older adults and 
studies concerning their receptivity to specific types of marketing 
messages. These studies suggest a strong neurobiological component, 
as well as a psychosocial component, in the making of consumer and 
investment decisions. 
In Part IV, I will turn to the question of investment risk. It is 
well understood that people's risk tolerance declines with age. Risk 
tolerance, however, is as much a factor of wealth as of age. That is, 
some older adults, especially those with discretionary funds, may af-
firmatively embrace risk. Unlike some fraud victims who may fail to 
recognize the risk that they are taking, victims with an appetite for 
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risk may see their aggressive investment choices as part of their "cha-
racter" or as a mark of their manhood.5 
Part V will consider additional influences that may cause an old-
er adult to respond to sales claims promising implausible investment 
returns. These influences include grandiosity, greed, pride, and a de-
sire to please others. Still other influences, from diet to mood, also 
contribute to older investors' scamming vulnerability. 
Part VI will consider the content of current fraud prevention 
education efforts. It will offer both some obvious and less obvious 
criticisms of these efforts. The fact is, much of today's fraud preven-
tion education may totally miss its mark. Part VII recommends some 
alternative strategies that might better advance the objective of fraud 
prevention, especially among older adults. 
II. Schemers and Their Victims 
Con artists are endlessly imaginative when it comes to crafting 
securities fraud schemes. They invoke current buzzwords,6 offer 
compelling wealth scenarios,7 present their products as "guaranteed" 
5. The word choice here is deliberate. Securities fraud victims are far more 
frequently men than women. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
6. See, e.g., SEC v. Homeland Safety Int'l, Inc., SEC Litig. Release 20645, 2008 
SEC LEXIS 1626 Ouly 15, 2008) (detailing allegations that the defendants had pro-
moted stock in a company whose product, a hand-held bomb detector, was de-
scribed as "a critical breakthrough in the global war against terrorism"); SEC v. 
Gibbs, SEC Litig. Release No. 20503, 2008 SEC LEXIS 630 (Mar. 19, 2008) (detailing 
allegations that the defendant had raised $21 million in a scheme premised on the 
assertion that he was an experienced currency trader who would pool investors' 
funds and trade on the Foreign Exchange Market (Forex)). 
7. See, e.g., SEC v. Gibbs, SEC Litig. Release No. 20503, 2008 SEC LEXIS 630 
(Mar. 19, 2008) (detailing allegations that the defendant had raised $21 million by 
selling interests in a currency trading fund promising to pay investors interest of 
3-5% per month (up to 60% annually)); In re Nadel, Exchange Act Release No. 
57123, 2008 SEC LEXIS 51 Oan. 10, 2008) (detailing allegations that the defendant 
had raised $15 million through the sale of "promissory notes" with returns rang-
ing from 10% to 75% annually); SEC v. Secure Inv. Servs., Inc., SEC Litig. Release 
No. 20255, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1897 (Aug. 24, 2007) (detailing allegations that the de-
fendant had raised $25 million by selling "safe, secure, and profitable" interests in 
life insurance policies with potential annual returns of up to 125%); SEC v. Credit 
First Fund, L.P., SEC Litig. Release No. 19952, 2006 SEC LEXIS 3011 (Dec. 20, 2006) 
(detailing allegations that the defendant had sold securities promising a monthly 
return of 1-3%); United States v. Reeder, SEC Litig. Release No. 18933, 2004 SEC 
LEXIS 2389 (Oct. 15, 2004) (noting that the defendant had pleaded guilty to orches-
trating a Ponzi scheme that raised over $16 million by promising 120% annual re-
turns). 
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or "can't lose" propositions,8 and befuddle their victims by using fan-
cy "finance speak."9 Most fraud schemes offer promises of quick rich-
es. Many of them are classic Ponzi schemes.10 Investors of any age 
can succumb to dreams of easy money. 11 Investors over age sixty dis-
proportionately do so.12 
8. See, e.g., SEC v. Rennie, SEC Litig. Release No. 20865, 2009 SEC LEXIS 166 
Oan. 23, 2009) (detailing how the defendant raised at least $2 million through the 
sale of "risk free federal housing certificates" that paid up to 12% per year, tax 
free); People v. Heath, SEC Litig. Release No. 20753, 2008 SEC LEXIS 2155 (Sept. 
29, 2008) (noting that the defendant was convicted in state court for a scheme that 
raised $187 million through the sale of "secured" notes that paid a "guaranteed" 
return); SEC v. IDPM Group, Inc., SEC Litig. Release No. 20354, 2007 SEC LEXIS 
2533 (Oct. 31, 2007) (noting that the defendants were alleged to have raised $3.6 
million through the sale of certificates of deposit described as "insured by the 
FDIC"); SEC v. AmeriFirst Funding, Inc., SEC Litig. Release No. 20236, 2007 SEC 
LEXIS 1781 (Aug. 9, 2007) (noting that the defendants were alleged to have mar-
keted a product called "Secured Debt Obligations" (SDOs) that carried "little or no 
risk" because they were "guaranteed by a commercial bank, protected by many 
layers of insurance coverage and fully secured by collateral"); State v. Pace, 677 
N.W.2d 762, 765 (Iowa 2004) (noting that the defendant assured his elderly victim 
that his products were "fully insured by Lloyds of London"); Sterling Trust Co. v. 
Adderley, 168 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2005) (noting that the promoter told his vic-
tims that investing in his company carried "no risk" and that "any principal in-
vested would be protected"). 
9. See, e.g., SEC v. W Fin. Group, LLC., SEC Litig. Release No. 20515, 2008 
SEC LEXIS 764 (Apr. 3, 2008) (noting that the defendant was alleged to have raised 
$17.9 million through the sale of "Secured Debt Obligations" purportedly secured 
by automobile financing receivables); SEC v. Premium Income Corp., SEC Litig. 
Release No. 20235, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1771 (Aug. 9, 2007) (noting that the defendant 
was alleged to have raised more than $11 million through the sale of securities in a 
company that promised to write covered options in the foreign currency market). 
10. See, e.g., SEC v. Stringer, SEC Litig. Release No. 20857, 2009 SEC LEXIS 126 
Oan. 21, 2009) (noting that the defendant was alleged to have raised $8.5 million 
from elderly investors in a Ponzi scheme promoted as a hedge fund); SEC v. Unli-
mited Cash, Inc., SEC Litig. Release No. 19640, 2006 SEC LEXIS 754 (Apr. 4, 2006) 
(noting that the defendant was alleged to have raised $18 million in a Ponzi 
scheme marketed through insurance agents and "estate planning" seminars aimed 
at older people); SEC v. Cook, SEC Litig. Release No. 18217, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1580 
Ouly 7, 2003) (noting that the defendant was sentenced to seventeen and a half 
years in prison for orchestrating a $45 million Ponzi scheme aimed at elderly citi-
zens and religious groups); United States v. Cossey, SEC Litig. Release No. 17620, 
2002 SEC LEXIS 1818 Ouly 17, 2002) (noting that the defendant was sentenced for a 
scheme that raised over $150 million from mostly elderly investors). 
11. See Mitchell Zuckoff, The Perfect Mark: How a Massachusetts Psychotherapist 
Fell for a Nigerian E-Mail Scam, NEW YORKER, May 15, 2006, at 36. 
12. See Jeremy Grant, Rich Seniors of US Become Ideal Victims for Fraudsters, FIN. 
TIMES, July 22, 2006, at 2 (noting that according to the North American Securities 
Administrators Association, fraud against seniors accounts for almost half of all 
complaints received by state securities regulators); Sid Kirchheimer, Scam Targets: 
What's Age Got to Do with It?, http:/ /www-static-w3-ca.aarp.org/money/ 
consumer/articles/scam_targets_what.htrnl (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) (noting 
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Many of the securities fraud schemes aimed at older investors 
involve high-pressure telephone or spam e-mail campaigns.13 A re-
cent popular scheme features "free lunches," in which salesmen hold-
ing themselves out as "senior specialists" exhort the assembled diners 
to invest in the sponsor's proprietary investment products.14 Victims 
often are persuaded to liquidate their retirement funds in order to ex-
ploit these investment "opportunities."15 Often the promoters enlist 
local senior community leaders to act as "hosts" for their free lunch 
offerings.16 These people, proud to be recognized, unwittingly are 
seen as vouching for the promoter's integrity and reliability.17 
Many of these fraud schemes contain misrepresentations or 
promises that are so implausible that most reasonable investors 
"would dismiss [them] as absurd."18 Still, many smart and well-
educated older investors fall for these investment schemes. What ac-
counts for this troubling scenario? The answer may be found in a 
combination of factors that collectively result in a pernicious cycle of 
fraud. 
that people over age sixty make up only one-eighth of the U.S. population but 
represent one out of three scam victims). 
13. See, e.g., SEC v. Empire Dev. Group, SEC Litig. Release No. 20122, 2007 
SEC LEXIS 1052 (May 18, 2007) (noting that the defendants employed "high pres-
sure sales tactics and cold-calling to sell unregistered securities of bogus real estate 
development companies, to unsuspecting investors, including elderly people with 
limited means"); SEC v. Discover Capital Holdings Corp ., SEC Litig. Release No. 
18988, 2004 SEC LEXIS 2827 (Dec. 1, 2004) (noting that the defendants used spam 
e-mail and "misleading, high-pressure sales calls" to sell shares). 
14. See, e.g., California v. Heath, SEC Litig. Release No. 20438, 2008 SEC LEXIS 
145 (Jan. 24, 2008) (noting the felony conviction of promoters who raised more 
than $187 million mostly from elderly investors by providing "free lunch" semi-
nars and inducing guests to purchase so-called secured notes); see also OFFICE OF 
COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, SEC, N. AM. SEC. ADM'RS ASS'N & 
FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AU1H., PROTECTING SENIOR INVESTORS: REPORT OF 
EXAMINATIONS OF SECURITIES FIRMS PROVIDING "FREE LUNCH" SALES SEMINARS 
(2007), http:/ /www.sec.gov /spotlight/seniors/freelunchreport.pdf [hereinafter 
PROTECTING SENIOR INVESTORS] (describing the "free lunch" marketing approach, 
which includes door prizes, free books, and vacation deals to encourage atten-
dance, and the terminology used to advertise these programs ("Senior Financial 
Safety Workshop" or "Senior Financial Survival Seminar")). 
15. SEC v. Grabarnick, SEC Litig. Release No. 18833, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1781 
(Aug. 16, 2004) (noting that many of the victims had rolled over money from IRA 
and 401(k) accounts in order to purchase investments in unregistered LLCs). 
16. See PROTECTING SENIOR INVESTORS, supra note 14, at 15. 
17. See id. 
18. Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing "the 
Reasonable Investor" with "the Least Sophisticated Investor" in Inefficient Markets, 81 
TUL. L. REV. 473, 476 (2006). 
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As a result of some important research based on voice record-
ings of securities fraud schemers interacting with their elderly victims, 
we now know a great deal both about the schemers' methods and the 
behaviors of people who fall victim to their schemes.19 
First, consider the perpetrators' trick bag. Investment fraud 
schemes often are carefully designed to employ influence tactics 
known to be effective with older adults.20 These tactics include 
"source credibility" (claiming to be from a known legitimate busi-
ness); "scarcity" (making the product offered seem rare or unattaina-
ble unless an immediate decision is made); "social consensus" (sug-
gesting that many others already have invested in the product so the 
victim ought not to forego this opportunity to join a winning group); 
and "phantom fixation" (dangling the prospect of wealth and riches). 21 
Good con artists know how to customize their sales pitch to play 
to their victims' psychological needs.22 They often "profile" their vic-
tims through lengthy or repeated conversations in order to identify 
the precise "hot buttons" that will lead to a positive investment deci-
sion.23 Indeed, these con artists have learned "to find out all they can 
19. NASD INvESTOR EDUC. FOUND., INVESTOR FRAUD STUDY FINAL REPORT 5 
(2006), http:/ /www.finrafoundation.org/web/groups/foundation/@foundation/ 
documents/foundation/p118422.pdf [hereinafter INvESTOR FRAUD STUDY]. 
20. Id. at 6. 
21. Id. at 10. Other influence tactics include comparison (suggesting that the 
victim is getting a discount); friendship (appearing to be the victim's friend); 
commitment (extracting a commitment from the victim early in the relationship 
and then reminding the victim he has already made a purchase decision from 
which he should not consider retreating); reciprocity (doing a small favor for the 
victim that makes the victim feel a need to reciprocate); fear (intimidating the vic-
tim); authority (playing the role of an authority figure so as to suggest the victim 
should do what he is told); and dependency (playing the role of a young, inexpe-
rienced person in order to induce the victim to try to help him out by buying 
whatever he is selling). Id. at 10-11. 
22. Id. at 10; see also Jayne W. Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, and Deter-
rence, 113 PENN. ST. L. REv. 185, 206-07 (2008) (detailing the ways in which con 
men identify their victims, develop a "fraud script," adapt to their victims' chang-
ing emotional temperature level, and exploit their victims' psychological needs). 
23. INVESTOR FRAUD STUDY, supra note 19, at 12; see also Old Scams-New Vic-
tims: Breaking the Cycle of Victimization, Hearing Before the Spec. Comm. on Aging, 
109th Cong. 20 (2005) [hereinafter Old Scams-New Victims] (statement of Zane M. 
Hill, Acting Assistant Chief Inspector, United States Postal Inspection Service). 
Searches of telemarketers' places of business have turned up files the fraudsters 
have maintained on their victims. "The files contained intimate details of the vic-
tims' health, the names of their children, vacation and travel memories, and even 
information on deceased spouses." Id. 
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about their customer and then match that customer profile with just 
the right influence tactic for maximum effect."24 
Good con artists are also good businessmen.25 They often pur-
chase "mooch lists" of people who have previously been victims of 
others' fraud schemes in order to minimize their search costs for new 
victims.26 They also can "reload" their existing crop of victims. 
When fraud operators are successful in obtaining money from a 
victim, they often make an attempt to gain even more money. 
This is the reload. In a typical reload, the fraud operator contacts 
the victim again and alters the original sum or represents a new 
scam sweepstakes. Winners may be told that their prize has been 
increased but that additional fees are necessary to claim the new 
prize, and then starts the cycle of the reload. Victims in fraudu-
lent investment schemes may be convinced to invest more money 
or to convert their investment to another market product that in-
variabl}; is worth even less than what they initially had been sold 
before. 
Con artists are agile communicators, too. In dealing with their 
victims, they will assume different roles-"authorities, friends, even 
dependents-to create a platform of trust."28 They also traffic in 
charm.29 They understand that "niceness" and "respect" or "defe-
rence" are disproportionately valued by older adults.30 Sometimes, 
however, they can turn off the charm. In closing a sale, they may be-
come insistent, menacing, and even physically threatening.31 Con art-
ists are just that: masterful manipulators of their victims' emotions, 
skillful persuaders, and talented crooks. 
24. INVESTOR FRAUD STUDY, supra note 19, at 13. 
25. See Barnard, supra note 22, at 199. The use of the male gender here is ap-
propriate. The con artist universe is overwhelmingly male. 
26. Old Scams-New Victims, supra note 23, at 20-21 (statement of Zane M. Hill, 
Acting Assistant Chief Inspector, United States Postal Inspection Service). 
27. ld. 
28. See id. at 40 (statement of Anthony R. Pratkanis, Ph.D., Professor of Psy-
chology, University of California at Santa Cruz). 
29. See, e.g., id. at 54 (statement of Denise C. Park, Ph.D., Co-Director, Nation-
al Institute on Aging, Roybal Center for Healthy Minds, University of Illinois, Ur-
bana-Champaign). 
30. See id. ("[W]hen older adults meet a charming charlatan, they are going to 
be biased towards processing the positive information about the individual: his 
niceness, attractiveness, and warmth towards them, and be less likely to note the 
inconsistency of his story, or his tendency to gloss over specifics, which would 
make him seem untrustworthy to a younger adult."). 
31. Audio tape: Real Life Sales Pitches, recorded by FINRA Investor Educa-
tion Foundation, http:/ /www.finrafoundation.org/resources/research (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2009). 
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Who are the victims of securities fraud schemes? In a nutshell, 
the older adults who are victimized by securities fraud schemes are 
male, married, college-educated, and financially comfortable.32 They 
have a personality that is "very self-reliant and self-deterministic."33 
They feel competent, not helpless, to make investment decisions.34 
They often rely on their own judgments, rather than on accountants or 
financial planners, in identifying their investment objectives and se-
lecting investment targets.35 They are significantly more likely than 
nonvictims to have previously invested in high-risk products such as 
penny stocks, promissory notes, and foreign currency.36 
Importantly, securities fraud victims do not meet the stereotype 
of the "frail or lonely victim .. . . While some victims are indeed lone-
ly, others are quite active in their communities and can be leaders in 
their communities."37 They generally also are more optimistic about 
their financial futures than a demographically similar group of non-
victims asked the same questions.38 
In addition, and perhaps surprisingly, securities fraud victims 
are more financially literate than nonvictims or victims of other types 
of fraud.39 Researchers have offered three explanations for this phe-
nomenon: (1) securities fraud victims may have an abstract under-
standing of investment products but do not employ that knowledge 
when it is needed the most ("the knowing-doing gap"); (2) they may 
be unwilling to admit the limits of their knowledge when dealing with 
an aggressive promoter of an investment opportunity ("the expert 
snare"); and (3) they may be overborne by the powerful persuasion 
tactics employed by con artists seeking their money.'0 In any event, 
these victims are generally familiar with investment concepts and vo-
32. INVESTOR FRAUD STUDY, supra note 19, at 20. 
33. Id. at 7. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 15. 
36. FINRA INVESTOR EDUC. FOUND., SENIOR FRAUD RISK SURVEY 2 (2007), 
http:/ /www.finra.org/web/groups/sai/documents/sai_original_content/p03670 
2.pdf. 
37. Old Scams-New Victims, supra note 23, at 42 (statement of Anthony R. 
Pratkanis, Ph. D., Professor of Psychology, University of California at Santa Cruz). 
38. INVESTOR FRAUD STUDY, supra note 19, at 15. 
39. ld. at 17. 
40. Id. at 19-20. 
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cabulary.41 They often have enjoyed success in their business life and 
in previous investment decisions.42 Securities fraud victims are also 
more likely than nonvictims to have experienced events in the recent 
past that have made their life more difficult, such as problems with 
transportation, problems with health, or problems with mobility.43 In 
short, they are eager to hear some good news. 
What can we make of this picture? On the one hand, we have 
sophisticated schemers with a deep understanding of their victims' 
character and susceptibility to influence tactics. On the other, we have 
stubborn, self-reliant victims who are reluctant, for a variety of rea-
sons, to question a promoter's description of his product and, when 
asked to commit to an investment decision, to assert themselves and 
ask for more time or simply to "just say no." Many of the reasons 
they do not resist their defrauders are outside the victims' conscious 
knowledge. 
III. Older Adults' Receptivity to Promotional Messages 
In thinking about the role that education might play in averting 
some of the kinds of frauds targeted at older investors, we must begin 
with a qrief excursion into the brain. We know that, in reaching deci-
sions, all adults are guided by cognitive biases, such as anchoring to 
initial impressions, reluctance to retreat from decisions previously 
made, overconfidence generally, and a sense of competence and per-
sonal agency.44 They also are subject to a "truth bias," meaning a ten-
dency to evaluate a statement as truthful rather than deceitful.45 But 
are there additional cognitive biases, or cognitive processes, that are 
present in older adults, but not present in younger and midlife adults, 
41. Karen Blumenthal, Fraud Doesn't Always Happen to Someone Else, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 12, 2009, at Dl. 
42. ld. 
43. INVESTOR FRAUD STUDY, supra note 19, at 21. 
44. See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law 
from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. 
REv. 627, 639 (1996) ("A fair body of research suggests that people (perhaps espe-
cially those high in social and economic status) exhibit a predictable overconfi-
dence in their ability to control future events and avoid risks."); Robert A. Prentice, 
Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 V AND. L. 
REV. 1663, 175~1 (2003) (enumerating common adult cognitive biases). 
45. Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2570 (2008). 
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that might account for their disproportionate attraction to fraudulent 
investment schemes? The answer is a qualified "yes." 
Gerontologists, psychologists, and neuroscientists today know a 
great deal about both the physical and cognitive declines associated 
with aging.46 We know, for example, that human brains shrink as they 
age and that, in some portions of the brain, shrinkage may accelerate 
as a person passes midlife.'7 This shrinkage, however, need not lead 
to cognitive deficits.48 In fact, studies show that older adults often are 
able to "recruit" different brain regions than those utilized by younger 
adults in order to perform many cognitive tasks.49 While they may 
process information or perform those tasks in different ways (or by 
utilizing more brain regions), older adults can achieve the same result 
as younger adults. Importantly, though, they are likely to reach that 
result more slowly.50 
A lot of what we know about older adults' information 
processing comes from marketing studies.51 Long before gerontology 
emerged as a specialty and long before functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) became commonplace in psychological research, mar-
keters wanted to know how to induce older adults to purchase their 
products. Thus, there is a rich lode of research into the receptivity of 
older adults to certain types of advertising messages and ancillary in-
formation about how these consumers process novel ideas. 52 
Much of this research has focused on memory. Memory in-
volves two separate activities, encoding and retrieval.53 Older adults 
46. See Naftali Raz et al., Regional Brain Changes in Aging Healthy Adults: Gen-
eral Trends, Individual Differences and Modifiers, 15 CEREBRAL CORTEX 1676 (2005). 
47. Id. at 1680. 
48. Id. at 1685. 
49. See Trey Hedden & John D.E. Gabrieli, Insights into the Ageing Mind: A 
View from Cognitive Neuroscience, 5 NATURE REvs.: NEUROSCIENCE 87, 88 (2004) 
("One possibility is that older adults use preserved knowledge and experience to 
form more efficient or effective strategies when performing tasks in which young-
er adults rely on processing ability."). 
50. Deborah Roedder John & Catherine A. Cole, Age Differences in Information 
Processing: Understanding Deficits in Young and Elderly Consumers, 13 J. CONSUMER 
REs. 297,306 (1986); Catherine Cole et al., Decision Making and Brand Choice by Older 
Consumers, 19 MARKETING LETTERS 355, 361 (2008). 
51. See, e.g., John & Cole, supra note 50, at 297. 
52. See Gary]. Gaeth & Timothy B. Heath, The Cognitive Processing of Mislead-
ing Advertising in Young and Old Adults: Assessment and Training, 14 J. CONSUMER 
REs. 43, 45 (1987). 
53. John & Cole, supra note 50, at 299 tbl.l. 
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may have problems with both activities.54 They often "fail to use or-
ganizational strategies" that would permit them to encode useful in-
formation.55 And even when they have encoded a memory, they may 
"fail to use efficient retrieval strategies."56 Thus, they may not recall or 
apply useful information to which they have previously been ex-
posed.57 
For marketers, these two problems are a source of consternation. 
Older consumers may not be able to recall advertisements or distin-
guish among brand names.58 "By using fewer processing strategies, 
and by processing at slower speeds, the elderly can be expected to ex-
hibit problems with information loads that pose little difficulty for 
younger adults."59 
Older adults are particularly challenged by tasks that: 
(1) contain large amounts of information; 
(2) convey the information in formats that make encoding diffi-
cult; 
(3) fail to include prompts or instructions to guide processing 
and evaluation; and 
(4) require difficult response formats.60 
All of these factors can be manipulated by marketers to facilitate 
product preference decisions,61 but all of them also can be manipu-
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 304. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 302. 
60. Id. at 305. A simple example of this problem is making a left-hand tum at 
a busy intersection. Barbara Freund & Freddi Segal-Gidan, The Older Adult Driver: 
Issues and Concerns for the Geriatric Clinician, 11 ANNALS LONG-TERM CARE 37, 37 
(2003): 
A person waiting to make a left-hand tum, for example, is processing, 
storing, retrieving, and then making decisions based on constantly 
changing information or environmental queues from oncoming traf-
fic, the driver's own vehicle, what their speed is, zero to 60 in how 
many seconds, acceleration capability, etc. Because elderly drivers 
generally exhibit slower processing of that information, they are not 
as efficient as younger drivers. 
61. See George P. Moschis, Marketing to Older Adults: An Updated Overview of 
Present Knowledge and Practice, 20 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 516, 523 (2003) (re-
commending that advertisements aimed at elderly consumers should "focus only 
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lated by con artists in order to bamboozle their victims.62 For example, 
a promoter can provide long, complex offering documents that set out 
the terms of investment in impenetrable language and exotic mathe-
matical formulae. 63 The promoter can require a quick decision with-
out permitting the victim the time required to consider his options, 
calculate rate of return, or acknowledge his confusion about what is 
being offered.64 
There are three additional important conclusions from the mar-
keting literature applicable to our inquiry. First, older adults are like-
ly to retain information from and prefer advertisements that speak to 
their emotional needs.65 That is, in experiments older adults remem-
bered a relatively higher proportion of information from advertise-
ments with emotionally meaningful content than from knowledge-
based advertisements.66 They also preferred advertisements with emo-
tionally meaningful content.67 These findings may help explain why 
the idea of building wealth for their grandchildren's education or to 
finance family vacations seems to have so much power with older in-
vestors. 
Second, older adults do not like to be reminded that they are old. 
They resist ads that feature infirm characters or wrinkly spokesmen.68 
Rather, "the aging person wants to maintain his or her youthful self-
concept, so messages that reinforce the perception of being the 'same 
person,' and the notion that a person of a certain age is like a person of 
any age," are likely to be more effective than messages that emphasize 
on few, key points," "present information at a slow pace," "keep the message short 
and simple," and "keep the background/environment simple and uncluttered"). 
62. See SID KIRCHHEIMER, SCAM PROOF YOUR LIFE 316--17 (2006). 
63. See INVESTOR FRAUD STUDY, supra note 19, at 10. 
64. ld. at 11 . 
65. Helene H. Fung & Laura L. Carstensen, Sending Memorable Messages to the 
Old: Age Differences in Preferences and Memory for Advertisements, 85 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 163, 164 (2003). 
66. ld. at 168. 
67. ld. at 173. These findings, of course, drive advertisers to create marketing 
campaigns like the "my grandson" ads for Werther's Candies or the ads for Rascal 
Scooters that reflect older consumers' desire for family closeness. It also may ex-
plain why fraud victims are more likely to respond to emotionally robust "get 
rich-build a nest egg for your family" messages than to colder, fact-based "look 
out for con artists" messages delivered by the government. See id. at 175. The rela-
tive appeal of these messages is a topic to which we will return in Part V. 
68. See Moschis, supra note 61, at 523-24. 
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age.69 That is, messages that encourage an older consumer to see him-
self as his younger, virile, masterful self are likely to be far more effec-
tive than messages that encourage him to see himself as deficient or 
disempowered.70 These findings may help explain why appeals to an 
investor's financial acumen and impressive market savvy seem to be 
so effective in inducing a risky investment decision. 
Third, older adults sometimes respond to their changing social 
identity by engaging in compulsive consumer behavior.71 That is, 
some "role transitions," such as retirement, grandparenthood, onset of 
chronic medical conditions, or loss of one's spouse are so stressful for 
some consumers that they initiate behaviors designed to reassert a 
sense of control.72 This behavior may include compulsive buying, 
shoplifting, substance abuse, or binge eating.73 It may also include 
compulsive gambling.74 This is not behavior that is transient or harm-
less. It is "inappropriate, typically excessive, and clearly disruptive to 
the lives of individuals who appear [compulsively] driven to con-
sume."75 
Importantly, even if they are not compulsive consumers, older 
adults are often impulsive consumers. Researchers have found that 
"older consumers are less likely than young people to carefully eva-
luate an advertisement or consider alternatives before making pur-
69. Id. at 523. 
70. Id. at 523-24. These findings drive advertisers to build campaigns show-
ing men in their forties, rather than men in their seventies, enjoying the benefits of 
erectile dysfunction drugs. They also may explain why ads for Centrum Silver vi-
tamins feature healthy models riding bicycles or why ads for the nutritional sup-
plement Ensure feature a fifty-year-old woman using the product and then going 
dancing rather than an eighty-year-old woman sitting in a nursing home chair. Id. 
at 523. 
71. Anil Mathur et al., Compulsive Consumer Behaviors of Older Adults, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF 1HE THIRD INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH SEMINAR ON MARKETING 
COMMUNICATIONS AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 379, 383-84 (Yves Evrard et al. eds., 
1999). 
72. Id. at 383. 
73. Id. at380-81,383-84. 
74. Dennis P. McNeilly, Minding the Mind in Older Gamblers: Gambling in Older 
Adults Might Signal Cognitive Declines, ADDICTION PROF., Nov. 2007, http://www. 
entrepreneur.com/ tradejoumals/ article/ 172176734.htrnl (showing that approx-
imately 5% of older adults in the adult general population exhibit problem or pa-
thological gambling behavior). 
75. Mathur et al., supra note 71, at 380 (quoting Ronald J. Faber et al., Compul-
sive Consumption, ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 132, 132 (1987). 
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chases."76 This may be the result of information overload or lack of 
adequate time in which to make a reasoned decision.77 Or, it may be 
the result of brain changes in the part of the brain that regulates com-
portment, insight, and reasoning. 
Recent neurological studies suggest that shrinkage in the pre-
frontal region of the brain may account for some older adults' inability 
to process information necessary to make good financial judgments.78 
In experiments first conducted at the University of Iowa, subjects (in-
cluding a cohort of subjects over fifty-five years of age) were asked to 
play a computerized card game (the Iowa Gambling Task or IGT) in 
which players had to select cards from among four decks.79 When 
turned face up, each card would reveal a dollar value, sometimes pos-
itive (+$50) and sometimes negative (-$75).80 Two of the decks were 
preprogrammed to deliver more positive dollar cards than negative 
dollar cards ("winning decks"), and two were preprogrammed to be 
"losing decks."81 The object of the game was to emerge from the game 
with a positive dollar score. A key finding was that "[s]ome partici-
pants learned to stay away from the high-risk decks and won easily. 
76. Gary Kuhlmann, The Business and Biology of Consumer Fraud, ILLUMINE, 
Fall 2004, at 31, 32, available at http:/ /www.uiowa.edu/-illumffie/issues-2004/ 
fall-2004/PDFs/ fraud. pdf. 
77. George Fein et al., Older Adults Make Less Advantageous Decisions Than 
Younger Adults: Cognitive and Psychological Correlates, 13 J. lNT'L 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL SOC. 480, 481 (2007). 
78. Kuhlmann, supra note 76, at 33. The primary source for the information 
discussed in Kuhlmann's article is Natalie L. Denburg et al., The Ability to Decide 
Advantageously Declines Prematurely in Some Normal Older Persons, 43 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1099, 1099-1106 (2005). 
79. Kuhlmann, supra note 76, at 32. 
80. JONAH LEHRER, HOW WE DECIDE 45-46 (2009). 
[T]he cards weren't distributed at random. The scientists had 
rigged the game. Two of the decks were full of high-risk cards. These 
decks had bigger payouts ($100), but also contained extravagant pu-
nishments ($1,250). The other two decks, by comparison, were staid 
and conservative. Although they had smaller payouts ($50), they 
rarely punished the player. If the gambler drew only from those two 
decks, he would come out way ahead. 
At first, the card-selection process was entirely haphazard. There 
was no reason to favor any specific deck, and so most people sampled 
from each pile, searching for the most lucrative cards. On average, 
people had to turn over about fifty cards before they began to draw 
solely from the profitable deck. It took about eighty cards before the 
average experimental subject could explain why he or she favored 
those decks. 
81. Id. 
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Others seemed unable to distinguish between the good and the bad 
decks and lost the game because they continued to choose from decks 
that put them into greater and greater debt."82 
Researchers believe the latter subgroup of subjects suffered from 
a risk assessment deficit caused by an early-onset atrophy of the pre-
frontallobe.83 Even though these subjects exhibited "normal" cogni-
tive skills on tests evaluating their ability to recall words or to add up 
a column of numbers, they were not able to assemble and process in-
formation about financial risk.84 Thus, they were not able to shift their 
selection strategy in order to maximize their performance in the IGT 
"game." 
The subjects exhibiting this impairment in card selection also 
lacked the physiological response to risk exhibited by the subjects 
who mastered the game.as In addition, and significantly for this Ar-
ticle, the "losing" subjects in the Iowa Gambling Task were also una-
ble to detect misleading claims in advertisements later presented to 
them.86 "(P]articipants who had shown impaired decision-making 
skills in the Iowa Gambling Task were fooled by ads on everything 
from mutual funds to car deals to herbal pain relievers."87 They were 
also "more likely to indicate an intention to buy the article advertised 
in the misleading advertisement."88 
The Iowa studies are important for three reasons: (1) the percen-
tage of older adults who had difficulty identifying risk was not trivial; 
in the initial study, thirty-five percent of the sample population exhi-
bited the risk assessment deficit/9 (2) the risk assessment deficit could 
82. Kuhlmann, supra note 76, at 32. 
83. ld. 
84. ld. 
85. When the "winning" subjects selected a card from one of the high-risk 
decks, their bodies signaled recognition of the risk-taking decision as measured by 
a skin-conductance response (SCR); when the "losing" subjects selected a card 
from one of the high-risk decks, there was no bodily recognition. 
86. Kuhlmann, supra note 76, at 32. 
87. ld. 
88. Randall Parker, Brain Aging Makes Elderly Easier Prey for Con Artists, 
FUTUREPUNDIT, Jan. 14, 2008, www.futurepundit.com/archives/004925.html. 
89. Denburg et al., supra note 78, at 1102-04. Two follow-up studies by the 
same research team have now replicated the results of the first study. In the 
second study, twenty-five percent of the subjects fifty-six years old or older showed 
decision making impairment. Natalie L. Denburg et al., Psychophysiological Antici-
pation of Positive Outcomes Promotes Advantageous Decision-Making in Normal Older 
Persons, 611NT'L J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 19, 22 (2006) [hereinafter Anticipation of Pos-
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not be explained as a function of overall cognitive decline/0 and (3) the 
deficit appeared to have physical origins.91 Researchers currently are 
trying to identify the precise location in the brain of the "risk assess-
ment" function. 92 
One final study may offer an additional insight into how older 
adults process information and make decisions. Recently, neuroscien-
tists showed subjects a series of negative images, such as dead ani-
mals, and positive images, such as bowls of ice cream, and observed 
the subjects' brain activity through fMRl. 93 The older subjects (ages 
fifty-six to eighty-five) were much less responsive to negative or un-
pleasant images than they were to the positive images.94 In effect, they 
screened out the information they did not want to contemplate.95 This 
hard-wired resistance to negative messages "[may make older adults] 
happier people [than younger adults], but also mak[es] them more 
likely to miss the 'red flags' of a skilled fraudulent telemarketer."96 It 
is not coincidental that older consumers are far more predisposed to 
itive Outcomes]. In the most recent study, thirty-five to forty percent of the subjects 
fifty-six years old or older showed decision making impairment. Natalie L. Den-
burg et al., The Orbitofrontal Cortex, Real World Decision Making, and Normal Aging, 
1121 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 480, 480 (2007). These studies have also been repli-
cated by other researchers. Fein et al., supra note 77, at 487 (describing how fifteen 
percent of the subjects fifty-five years old or older showed decision making im-
pairment). 
90. As between impaired decision makers and unimpaired decision makers, 
"there were no significant differences in age, gender and handedness distribution, 
estimated verbal intellect, memory, language, attention and concentration skills, 
executive function abilities, or emotional status." Anticipation of Positive Outcomes, 
supra note 89, at 22. 
91. The Iowa study is not without its critics. A group of British scholars have 
suggested that the "losing" subjects in the Iowa study may not have a risk assess-
ment deficit at all, but may simply have taken longer than others to learn the rules 
of the game. Julia Deakin et a!., Risk Taking During Decision-Making in Normal Vo-
lunteers Changes with Age, 10 J. INT'L NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL SOC. 590, 591 (2004). 
92. See Natalia S. Lawrence et al., Distinct Roles of Prefrontal Cortical Subregions 
in the Iowa Gambling Task, 19 CEREBRAL CORTEX 1134 (2008); Joshua A. Weller et al., 
Neural Correlates of Adaptive Decision Making for Risky Gains and Losses, 18 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 958 (2007). 
93. Michael A. Kisley et al., Looking at the Sunny Side of Life: Age-Related Change 
in an Event-Related Potential Measure of the Negativity Bias, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 838, 839 
(2007). 
94. Id. at 841. 
95. Id. at 842. 
96. Elder Fraud: Exploiting the Aging Human Brain, SENIOR J., June 23, 2005, 
http:/ /seniorjoumal.com/NEWS/ Alerts/5-06-23ExploitingElderly.htm. 
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believe the claims of salesman than younger consumers.97 Nor is it 
coincidental that older adults are more trusting generally than people 
under fifty.98 
All of these studies-the marketing studies, the game-playing 
studies, the brain scanning studies, and the "trust" studies-offer 
some useful tools in addressing the troubling questions, "Which of the 
millions of older adults are likely to be vulnerable to securities fraud 
schemes and what types of interventions are most likely to protect 
them?" It is still necessary, however, to consider some additional fac-
tors that may play a role in older adults' investment decisions, such as 
attitude toward risk, decline in financial judgment, emotional needs, 
environmental factors, and the very human desire to give pleasure to 
others. 
IV. Risk Seeking in Older Adults 
We have now seen that there may be some-indeed many-
older adults who are impaired in their capacity to identify and assess 
risk in financial matters. This impairment, taken together with cogni-
tive biases linked to aging, makes these older adults susceptible to 
fraudulent offers.99 But what of the majority of older adults who have 
no risk assessment deficit? These investors presumably have the ca-
pacity to fully appreciate risk and its consequences. Should we not 
expect that the risk aversion associated with age will counterbalance 
the cognitive biases associated with age and thereby help to protect 
these investors from fraud? 
A more precise question is whether older adults' risk aversion is 
sufficient to offset their cognitive biases: receptivity to emotional ap-
97. Jinkook Lee & Horacia Soberon-Ferrer, An Empirical Analysis of Elderly 
Consumers' Complaining Behavior, 27 PAM. & CONSUMER SCI. REs. J. 341, 356 tbl.2 
(1999). There are two exceptions to these findings. Elderly consumers are less 
likely than younger consumers to believe the assertions of hearing aid salesmen 
and druggists. Id. 
98. PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS AND SOCIAL TRUST: WHO, WHERE AND 
WHY 1 (2007), http:/ /pewresearch.org/assets/social/pdf/SocialTrust.pdf. Trust 
also is positively associated with marital status, income, education, social class, 
and (for men) military service. Id. at 1, 5. 
99. See Old Scams-New Victims, supra note 23, at 54 (statement of Denise C. 
Park, Ph.D., Co-Director, National Institute on Aging, Roybal Center for Healthy 
Minds, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign). Those lacking in financial lite-
racy may have the capacity but lack the mental map with which to approach the 
task. 
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peals, receptivity to messages reinforcing the listener's sense of au-
tonomy, receptivity to optimistic messages, etc. No studies yet have 
attempted to answer this question. 
It may be, however, that the notion of risk aversion among older 
adults is overrated, especially regarding older adults with money. It 
is true that, as a general rule, risk aversion increases as adults reach 
retirement age.100 Recent studies, however, have teased out the role of 
wealth, gender, marital status, education, and the existence of 
offspring, as well as age, on risk aversion. 101 One study of the invest-
ment portfolios of households in which at least one member was se-
venty years old or older found that risk aversion (as measured by the 
percentage of "risky assets" in the portfolio) can vary significantly, 
given these demographic factors. 102 That is, relative risk aversion 
tends to increase after age seventy at any given level of wealth.103 
However, relative risk aversion decreases as wealth increases.104 So, for 
example, a single white female college graduate, in good health, and 
with one child, will decrease the percentage of risky assets in her port-
folio as she ages from seventy to ninety, but her overall risk tolerance 
will also depend on her net wealth. According to Bellante and Green, 
this woman's portfolio as she ages should look like this: 105 
Estimated Proportion of "Risky Assets" in Portfolio 
Net Worth 
Age $100,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 
70 0.255 0.416 0.503 
90 0.231 0.390 0.475 
Other demographic factors play a role as well: men are generally 
more risk tolerant than women/06 married people are more risk tole-
100. See Deakin et al., supra note 91, at 591. 
101. Don Bellante & Carole A. Green, Relative Risk Aversion Among the Elderly, 
13 REV. FIN. ECON. 269, 275 (2004); Martin Halek & Joseph G. Eisenhauer, Demo-
graphy of Risk Aversion, 68 J. RISK & INS. 1, 2 (2001). 
102. See Bellante & Green, supra note 101, at 271. 
103. ld. at 277. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 278 tbl.3. 
106. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfi-
dence, and Common Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261, 264-66 (2001); Gary Char-
ness & Uri Gneezy, Strong Evidence for Gender Differences in Investment (Sept. 18, 
2007), http:/ /www.econ.ucsb.edu/papers/wp24-07.pdf. 
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rant than people living alone/07 and college-educated people are more 
risk tolerant than those with only a high-school education.108 Cultural 
factors, too, may influence risk tolerance.109 
The Bellante and Green study is not the only one that reaches 
these conclusions. Another recent study took a different approach to 
the relationship between age, wealth, and risk tolerance, and reached 
essentially the same conclusion.110 Looking at self-reports, the authors 
found that a person's Risk Tolerance Score on a scale of one to one 
hundred (with one representing low risk tolerance and one hundred 
representing high risk tolerance) rose with wealth.111 For respondents 
over age sixty, the Risk Tolerance Scores looked like this:112 
Net asset <$50,000 
Band 
Mean 50.70 
$50,000-
$150,000 
45.64 
$150,000-
$500,000 
47.66 
$500,000- >$1,000,000 
$1,000,000 
52.03 56.72 
Another study of investors' allocation of funds in their Individu-
al Retirement Accounts (IRAs) confirms this pattern.113 The research-
ers, not surprisingly, found a general decline in risk tolerance with 
age, but looking at the IRAs of persons over sixty-five, they also found 
a positive relationship between risk tolerance and wealth.114 "Higher 
107. Bellante & Green, supra note 101, at 278. 
108. Id.; John E. Grable & Ruth H. Lytton, Investor Risk Tolerance: Testing the Ef-
ficacy of Demographics As Differentiating and Classifying Factors, 9 FIN. COUNSELING & 
PLAN. 61, 68 (1998) (finding that risk tolerance rises with educational attainment); 
Govind Hariharan et al., Risk Tolerance and Asset Allocation for Investors Nearing Re-
tirement, 9 FIN. SERVS. REV. 159, 167 (2000) (noting that educated people allocate 
more of their wealth to risky assets than less educated people); Halek & Eisenhau-
er, supra note 101, at 20 ("[A]t the margin, risk-taking rises with years of educa-
tion."). 
109. See Gongmeng Chen et al., Trading Performance, Disposition Effect, Overcon-
fidence, Representativeness Bias, and Experience of Emerging Market Investors, 20 J. 
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 425, 428 (2007) (citing studies that Asians are less risk 
averse and more confident than people in Western cultures). 
110. Terrence A. Hallahan et al., An Empirical Investigation of Personal Financial 
Risk Tolerance, 13 FIN. SERVS. REV. 57, 67 (2004). 
111. Id. at 60, 66. 
112. Id. at 69 tbl.4. 
113. Doug Waggle & Basil Englis, Asset Allocation Decisions in Retirement Ac-
counts: An A/l-or-Nothing Proposition?, 9 FIN. SERVS. REv. 79,90 (2000). 
114. Id. at 84. 
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age groups invest[ed] less in equity, and higher net worth groups in-
vest[ed] more."115 
Net Worth 
Quartile 
Cash 
Bonds 
Equity 
Lowest 
78.6 
21.4 
0 
Second 
71.3 
13.0 
15.7 
Third 
55.1 
13.8 
31.1 
Highest 
34.4 
13.9 
51.7 
These studies suggest that, for at least some investors, and par-
ticularly investors with significant unencumbered assets, a decision to 
pursue a risky investment strategy may not reflect a failure to recog-
nize risk, but instead a conscious (though perhaps flawed) decision to 
embrace risk.116 These investors' receptivity to risk, moreover, may be 
a function not only of their wealth but of their own high self-regard. 
"[H]igh self-esteem individuals who engage in risky behaviors often 
use cognitive strategies that protect them from recognizing their sus-
ceptibility to negative consequences of their behavior."117 
We must add to these conclusions recent evidence that, quite 
apart from risk tolerance or self-esteem, investment judgment "deteri-
orates sharply" at about age seventy.118 Korniotis and Kumar have 
found that investors in this age bracket earn lower risk-adjusted an-
nual returns than younger investors and exhibit worse stock selection 
ability and poorer diversification skills.119 This is especially true for 
people with significant portfolios.120 The authors attribute the differ-
ence to "cognitive aging,'' 121 a catch-all category that may include 
115. Id. 
116. Risk seeking may reflect a personality trait that endures throughout the 
life span. "If a person engages in risky behaviors in his 30s, then he's more likely 
than others to engage in risky behavior as an older adult." Old and Young Make 
Impulsive Decisions, USA TODAY, Dec. 1999, at 13, available at http:/ /findarticles. 
com/pI articles/ mi_m1272/ is_2655_128/ ai_58037927. 
117. Dwight Merunka et al., Modeling and Measuring the Impact of Fear, Guilt and 
Shame Appeals on Persuasion for Health Communication: A Study of Anti-Alcohol Mes-
sages Directed at Young Adults 7 (Euromed Marseille, Working Paper No. 04-200, 
2007), available at http:/ I ssm.com/ abstract=963593. 
118. George Komiotis & Alok Kumar, Do Older Investors Make Better Investment 
Decisions?, 92 REV. ECON. & STAT. (forthcoming 2010), available at http:/ /ssm.com/ 
abstract=767125. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
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memory loss, processing problems, confusion, depression, distraction, 
and mental attitude. The fact is, older adults' brains may work 
against them as they contemplate making investment decisions.122 
And an appetite for risk, likely a lifelong characteristic, is only going 
to make the chance of fraud victimization grow. 
V. Other Factors Predisposing Older Adults to Believe 
Fraudulent Claims 
What makes someone succumb to an investment offer that seems 
incredible? Does the buyer, as suggested in Part III, lack the capacity 
to recognize risk? Does he, as sJggested in Part IV, seek out risk but 
then discount or misjudge it? One theory that explains the success of 
securities fraud and other fraud schemes is that con artists appeal to 
their victims' "visceral needs" such as greed, fear, and the need for 
companionship or intimacy.123 Importantly, decisions made in an en-
vironment of "visceral influences" are "nearly devoid of cognitive de-
liberation."124 When making a purchase decision, for example, "ra-
tional, considered deliberation is [only] a small part of the decision 
process. Instead, action is driven by instinct and gut feelings, and 
careful analysis is abandoned."125 
Con artists, of course, understand the power of visceral needs.126 
They often consciously appeal to their victims' greed, loneliness, and 
fantasies of empowerment.127 They also know, or appear to know, that 
appeals to visceral needs can be enhanced by making the reward seem 
right around the corner (this is known as "reward proximity"), "vi-
vid," and achievable.128 
Several other psychological factors also may play a role in mak-
ing a purchase decision. One is conformity to others' expectations, 
meaning an instinct for pleasing people, including people who are ur-
gently trying to sell the listener a product. "In the realm of scams, 
122. See id. 
123. See Jeff Langenderfer & Terence A Shimp, Consumer Vulnerability to 
Scams, Swindles, and Fraud: A New Theory of Visceral Influences on Persuasion, 18 
PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 763, 768-70 (2001). 
124. Id. at 769. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 769-70. 
127. Id. at 768. 
128. See id. at 773-74. 
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perhaps no other personality trait is as likely to affect scamrning vul-
nerability."129 Another factor is self-control: the ability to substitute 
prudence for desire.130 "For individuals facing a scam offer, part of the 
decision process is whether to carefully examine the message or to in-
dulge their fantasies and accept the swindler's version of how the 
transaction will proceed."131 The ability to master and suppress one's 
desire for immediate gratification can play an important role in deci-
sions to resist securities fraud schemes. 
Still other factors that may influence the investment decision-
making process include alcohol or drug use,132 the decision maker's 
sense of command or dominance over his environment, 133 the decision 
maker's state of overall happiness or unhappiness/34 the decision 
maker's sense that a decision must be made quickly,135 hormonal in-
fluences/36 dietary factors/37 and even the time of day when the in-
vestment decision is made.138 
129. Id. at 779. 
130. Id. at 781. 
131. Id. 
132. Fein et a!., supra note 77, at 8. 
133. Studies in the Netherlands have shown that "simply putting someone into 
a weak social position impairs his cognitive function. Conversely, 'empowering' 
him, in the dread jargon of sociology, sharpens up the mind." From He That Hath 
Not, ECONOMIST, May 24, 2008, at 104. The research cited in this article may be 
found at Pamela K. Smith et a!., Lacking Power Impairs Executive Function, 19 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 441, 447 (2008). 
134. Marieke de Vries et a!., In the Winning Mood: Affect in the Iowa Gambling 
Task, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 42, 48 (2008) (concluding that subjects in 
positive mood states made better decisions than subjects in a negative mood); Mi-
sery Is Not Miserly: Why Even Momentary Sadness Increases Spending, SCIENCEDAJLY, 
Feb. 8, 2008, http:/ /www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/02/080208073436.htm 
(reporting that experimental subjects feeling sad and self-focused spend more 
money to acquire the same commodities as subjects in a neutral emotional state). 
135. Michael A. DeDonno & Heath A. Demaree, Perceived Time Pressure and the 
Iowa Gambling Task, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 636, 639 (2008) (reporting 
that research subjects informed that the time allotted for an activity would likely 
be inadequate made poorer decisions than subjects told that the time allotted 
would likely be sufficient). 
136. Studies in Austria have shown that administration of oxytocin via nasal 
inhalation can cause subjects to be made to trust strangers. And, "researchers at 
the University of Zurich have shown that people who inhale [oxytocin] continue to 
trust strangers with their money, even after they have been betrayed." What the 
Scientists Are Saying, WEEK (UK), June 7, 2008, at 16. The research cited in this ar-
ticle may be found at Thomas Baumgartner eta!., Oxytocin Shapes the Neural Circui-
try of Trust and Trust Adaptation in Humans, 58 NEURON 639 (2008). 
137. Studies in the Netherlands have shown that folic acid supplements can 
help subjects from fifty to seventy years old to ward off cognitive decline. Jane 
Durga et a!., Effect of 3-year Folic Acid Supplementation on Cognitive Function in Older 
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Pulling these observations together, it would seem that the most 
likely target for a securities fraud scheme would be a man with at 
least several hundred thousand dollars of accumulated wealth, a hear-
ty risk tolerance but also a risk assessment deficit, a strong sense (or at 
least a history) of personal autonomy, unexpressed but strong visceral 
needs, an instinct for pleasing people, a low capacity for self-control, 
and a recent, disempowering experience that has left him unhappy 
and feeling unfulfilled. This profile matches precisely the profile of 
actual victims of securities fraud schemes. 
VI. Fraud Prevention Education and Its Critics 
So far in this Article, we have examined five ideas: 
• The perpetrators of securities fraud schemes are innovative, 
clever, manipulative, and highly attuned to their victims' 
needs and aspirations; 
• The ability of older investors to detect and avoid fraud 
schemes may be impaired, or at least shaped, by brain 
processes over which they have no conscious control; 
• Older investors may be receptive to messages that promise 
them a chance at wealth and renewal, even if those messages 
clearly communicate risk; 
• Older investors may be particularly susceptible to messages 
(or messengers) that activate their visceral needs or appeal to 
their sense of mastery and desire to be young; 
• Older investors' susceptibility to fraud is exacerbated by a va-
riety of environmental influences. 
These ideas can be reflected schematically in what I call the "decep-
tion/ decision cycle." 
Adults in the FACIT Trial: A Randomised, Double Blind, Controlled Trial, 369 LANCET 
208 (2007). 
138. William von Hippel, Aging, Executive Functioning, and Social Control, 16 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 240, 242 (2007) (noting that older adults typi-
cally show better inhibition earlier rather than later in the day); Carolyn Yoon, Age 
Differences in Consumers' Processing Strategies: An Investigation of Moderating Influ-
ences, 24 J. CONSUMER REs. 329, 332, 335-40 (1997) (noting that older adults are like-
ly to perform cognitive tasks better in the morning than in the late afternoon). 
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The potent dynamic reflected in this diagram may account for 
the fact that many older investors make bad investment decisions. 
The problem may be compounded when investors lack basic financial 
literacy. "Only four percent of Americans have sufficient quantitative 
literacy skills to compare and contrast credit card offers or to calculate 
the total amount of interest from a home equity loan."139 Probably 
even fewer Americans have the necessary skills to fully understand 
139. Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The Growing 
Debt Burdens of Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 44 HARv. J. ON 
LEGIS. 167, 197 (2007). 
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investment products, diversification, asset allocation, and age-
appropriate strategies for investment management.140 
So, there can be little doubt that we need more financial literacy 
education in the United States, beginning in elementary school and 
continuing well past retirement age.141 But financial literacy does not 
seem to be the primary problem for many of the people who have 
been victimized by securities fraud schemes.142 Many of them are fi-
nancially literate in the sense that they could pass a paper-and-pencil 
test or articulate their line of reasoning in reaching an investment de-
cision.143 These people, though, for one or many of the reasons sug-
gested above, may not appreciate the signals associated with fraud. 
This brings us back to the issue of fraud prevention education. 
Can education effectively disrupt the deception/ decision cycle por-
trayed here? If the answer is "yes," at which point(s) in the cycle 
should education be offered and through which educational media? 
What should the fraud prevention message include? If the answer is 
"no," then what should we do instead to interdict fraud? 
To answer these questions, at least preliminarily, let us consider 
briefly the various types of fraud prevention education currently on 
offer. These include written brochures, videos and DVDs, web sites 
and podcasts, small-group workshops at senior citizen gathering plac-
es, elaborate town meetings, literature enclosed with home-delivered 
meals, and celebration of a "National Fraud Against Senior Citizens 
Awareness Week."144 
Sponsors of these programs include the SEC/45 the North Ameri-
can Securities Administrators Association (NASAA)/46 the AARP,147 
140. See Annamaria Lusandi & Olivia Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Retirement 
Preparedness: Evidence and Implications for Financial Education, 42 Bus. ECON. 35, 
35 (2007) ("Many [American] households are unfamiliar with even the most basic 
economic concepts needed to make saving and investment decisions .... [They] 
appear woefully under-informed about basic financial computations, with serious 
implications for saving, retirement planning, mortgages, and other decisions."). 
141. See, e.g., James A. Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, 
Provision and Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 105, 142-46 
(1998); but see Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
197 (2008) (casting doubt on the efficacy of financial literacy education). 
142. See INVESTOR FRAUD STUDY, supra note 19, at 5. 
143. See id. 
144. See S. Res. 281, 107th Cong. (2002) (designating the week beginning Aug. 
25, 2002, as "National Fraud Against Senior Citizens Awareness Week"). 
145. See PROTECTING SENIOR INVESTORS, supra note 14, at 46. 
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the Federal Trade Commission,148 the Postal Inspection Service,149 the 
FINRA Educational Foundation/50 state attorneys general and regula-
tory bodies,151 some legal aid clinics,152 and many large brokerage 
firms.153 Organizations that serve the elderly, religious and communi-
ty organizations, financial advisors seeking clients, and local lifelong 
learning groups also often offer some form of fraud prevention educa-
tion. Ironically, the pervasiveness of fraud prevention advice and 
education may cause some older adults to feel safer from fraud than 
they really are. 
The fraud prevention programs now in place typically feature 
several commonsense messages: (1) if an investment opportunity 
seems to be too good to be true, it probably is; (2) do not make hasty 
investment decisions; (3) check the credentials of people seeking your 
money; (4) beware cold-callers; and (5) do not be too embarrassed to 
146. See Advising Seniors About Their Money: Who Is Qualified and Who Is Not: 
Hearing Before the Spec. Comm. On Aging, llOth Cong. (2007) (statement of Joseph P. 
Borg, President, North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc.) avail-
able at http:/ /aging.senate.gov /events/hr179jb.pdf. 
147. AARP.org, The Lure of Money: Before You Invest, http:/ /www.aarp.org/ 
money /consumer/articles/video_before_you_invest.html (last visited Nov. 12, 
2009); AARP.org, Spotting the Signs of an Investment Scam, http:/ /www.aarp. 
org/money /consumer/articles/scam_signs.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
148. Federal Trade Commission, Telemarketing Fraud Against Older Ameri-
cans, http:/ /www.ftc.gov /reports/Fraud/fraudcon.shtm (last visited Nov. 12, 
2009). 
149. U.S. Postal Inspectors, Crime Victim? Know Your Rights, http:/ I 
postalinspectors.uspis.gov I radDocs/ consumer I ncvrwmain.htm (last visited Nov. 
12, 2009). 
150. See Press Release, FINRA Investor Educ. Found., FINRA Investor Educa-
tion Foundation Grants Exceed $14M, http:/ /www.finra.org/PressRoom/ 
NewsReleases/2008NewsReleases/P038026 (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (announc-
ing the Investor Protection Campaign for Older Americans); SaveAndlnvest.org, 
Fighting Fraud 101: Smart Tips for Older Investors, http:/ /www.saveandinvest. 
org/55Plus/Fraud/index.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
151. See, e.g., California Department of Corporations, Seniors Against Invest-
ment Fraud (SAIF) Program, http:/ /www.corp.ca.gov /Education_Outreach/saif/ 
default.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); Florida Office of Financial Regulation, 
FSAIF-Seniors Against Investment Fraud, http:/ /www.flofr.com/director/fsaif. 
htrn (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); Iowa Insurance Division, SAIF: Seniors Against 
Investment Fraud, http:/ /www.iid .state.ia.us/saif/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); 
West Virginia State Auditor's Office, Securities Commission, http:/ /www.wvsao. 
gov /securitiescommission/ education/ saif.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
152. See, e.g., Stetson Law, Elder Consumer Protection Program, http:/ /elder. 
law.stetson.edu/elderconsumers (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
153. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Protecting Yourself from Fraud, http:/ /www.ml. 
com/index.asp?id=7695_7696_42133_42135_42237 _14533 (last visited Nov. 12, 
2009). 
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call the authorities if you believe you have been the victim of a 
crime.154 All of it is good advice, of course, but it rarely addresses the 
core problem for some older investors: perhaps they ought not be 
making financially consequential decisions at all. 
Critics of fraud prevention programs have been reluctant to 
speak too harshly of them. One critic has focused on the impenetra-
bility of the prose or poor design employed in many of the informa-
tional brochures.155 Barbara Black has decried the lack of resources 
and expertise devoted to the effort.156 Lawrence Cunningham has ar-
gued that today's investor education materials generally "represent a 
hodgepodge of material culled from disparate sources and lacking co-
herence."157 Donald Langevoort has suggested that educational mate-
rials may underplay the risks inherent throughout the investment 
market, in part because of their sponsors' obvious financial self-
interest.158 
Still other critics have focused on one of the ironies of cautionary 
educational literature: telling an older adult that some sorts of claims 
(e.g., magical medicine, weight-loss products, risk-free investments) 
are likely to be false may cause them to internalize that message in the 
short run but to recall the opposite message after a passage of time.159 
This surprising conclusion derives from two experiments. 
In the first study, when older adults were repeatedly told that a 
claim is false, repetition helped them remember the claim imme-
diately thereafter as false. But paradoxically, after three days had 
passed, the more times older adults had been warned that a claim 
154. See LARRY R. ABRAHAMSON, ELDER FRAUD PREVENTION 4-6, http: I I co. 
larirner.co.usl dal elder_fraud.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2009). 
155. See Old Scams-New Victims, supra note 23, at 56-57 (statement of Denise C. 
Park, Ph.D., Co-Director, National Institute on Aging, Roybal Center for Healthy 
Minds, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign) (concluding that about 25% of 
government fraud prevention brochures had "serious problems"). 
156. Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Of! Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. 
& COM. L. 303, 337 (2008) ("The SEC's efforts on behalf of investor education have 
been more of a slogan than regulatory action."). 
157. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767,791 (2002). 
158. Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor Protec-
tion: The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1139, 1165 (2003); 
see also Willis, supra note 141, at 259 (noting that financial services firms have little 
economic incentive to provide effective consumer education because they often 
profit from poor consumer choices). 
159. Ian Skurnik et al., How Warnings About False Claims Become Recommenda-
tions, 31 J. CONSUMER REs. 713, 713 (2005). 
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was false, the more likely they were to misremember the claim as 
true. In the second study, trying to discredit claims after making 
them familiar to older adults backfired and increased their ten-
dency to call those claims true.160 
In other words, repetition may compound the problem. Re-
peated characterization of a claim as false may only result in an older 
adult responding positively to the claim.161 Thus, rather than scaring 
him away from an implausible investment opportunity, fraud preven-
tion education may catapult an older person right into the arms of his 
defrauder. 
Critics of fraud prevention education also might point to the 
failures of other forms of "scare" advertising; marketers have learned 
that repetition of such messages "may lead to habituation, annoyance, 
and an increased tendency for individuals to tune out the message."162 
The people at whom this type of marketing is aimed may come to 
equate it with a "hectoring parent [lecturing] an errant child" andre-
ject the message even though they know it offers good advice.163 
One also might argue that the powerful role of emotion and de-
sire in making investment decisions "offers little hope for those who 
would attack swindling through education about swindling practic-
es."164 As a practical matter, information about con artists' tactics and 
admonitions to hang up on telemarketers may have little effect on 
those older adults whose deliberative powers are overcome by ap-
peals to their fears, their sense of self, or various visceral needs.165 The 
same may be true of less complex cognitive biases such as over-
optimism or overconfidence.166 As Stephen Choi has pointed out, 
160. Id. (emphasis added). 
161. A similar phenomenon may be found in the use of legal disclaimers. Ex-
perience has shown that a written disclaimer that Product A is not associated with 
Product B merely serves to reinforce the notion that the two products are related. 
Mitchell E. Radin, Disclaimers as a Remedy for Trademark Infringement: Inadequacies 
and Alternatives, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 59, 65 (1986) ("[T]he use of disclaimers of as-
sociation may actually increase consumer confusion in a trademark usage con-
text."). Thanks to Laura Heymann for pointing this out. 
162. Gerard Hastings et al., Fear Appeals in Social Marketing: Strategic and Ethical 
Reasons for Concern, 21 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 961, 966 (2004). 
163. Gerard Hastings & Lynn MacFadyen, The Limitations of Fear Messages, 11 
TOBACCO CONTROL 73,74 (2002). 
164. Langenderfer & Shimp, supra note 123, at 781. 
165. See id. at 769-70. 
166. See id. at 781. 
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"[d]eeply-rooted behavioral biases may be resistant to education ef-
forts. "167 
Finally, critics might argue that the most likely audience for 
fraud prevention education are those older adults who are already 
cautious, risk-averse investors who seek reinforcement of their fears 
and concerns.168 On the other hand, the type of person who is most 
likely to make an irrational investment decision-a stubborn, self-
reliant, risk-seeking seventy-five-year-oldman-is precisely the type 
of person least likely to seek out or internalize cautionary educational 
messages.169 Those messages must surely often miss their intended 
targets. 
Do these criticisms mean that we should abandon fraud preven-
tion education aimed at older adults? I am not quite prepared to 
make that claim. I can say that we have little-to-no evidence that 
fraud prevention education as it is currently practiced has been suc-
cessful with this population and very little reason to think it is likely 
to succeed. 
But, what if I am wrong? Is it possible that some types of fraud 
prevention education might actually assist older adults in avoiding 
investment fraud schemesi70 
167. Stephen J. Choi, A Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market Interme-
diaries, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45, 68 (2004). 
168. See Kent Daniel et al., Investor Psychology in Capital Markets: Evidence and 
Policy Implications, 49 J. MONETARY ECON. 139, 183 (2002). 
169. ld. ("A big obstacle in overcoming bias is that someone who is irrational in 
his direct investment decisions is also likely to be irrational in his decision to seek 
out investment advice, and in his choice of intermediaries."). 
170. We do know that one-on-one peer counseling can, in the short run, reduce 
revictimization rates of older adults who have been victimized in the past. Old 
Scams-New Victims, supra note 23, at 42 (statement of Anthony R. Pratkanis, Ph. D., 
Professor of Psychology, University of California at Santa Cruz) (explaining how 
in a "reverse boiler room" program in which volunteers called and counseled 
people whose names had been found on "mooch lists," then a few days later pro-
fessional telemarketers tried to persuade the victims to participate in a new (simu-
lated) scam, researchers found that their interventions were effective in reducing 
victimization rates by about 50%). We also know that well-designed public health 
programs can change unhealthy behavior in older adults. See, e.g., Lindy Clemson 
et al., The Effectiveness of a Community-Based Program for Reducing the Incidence of 
Falls in the Elderly: A Randomized Trial, 52 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc. 1487 (2004); C.K. 
Miller et al., Nutrition Education Improves Metabolic Outcomes Among Older Adults 
with Diabetes Mellitus: Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 34 PREVENTIVE 
MED. 252 (2002); Medical News Today, Pharmacy Care Program Can Increase Me-
dication Adherence in Elderly, http:/ /www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/ 
56977.php (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
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We assume that alerting people to their cognitive biases should 
help them take those biases into account when processing information 
and making decisions.171 Some recent fraud prevention materials have 
adopted this approach.172 We also assume that educating consumers 
about producers' marketing strategies can help equip them to make 
more informed consumer choices.173 Perhaps we could use these kinds 
of programs as a template for fraud prevention education. 
At our current state of knowledge, however, we have no theory 
about how to educate against investment fraud and no metrics to de-
termine whether educational programs are effective. We do not know 
whether alerting people to the possibility (or even the known exis-
tence) of a risk assessment deficit in the brain can help them in think-
ing in a new way about risky investment options. We do not know 
whether fraud prevention education can suppress a lifelong attraction 
to risk. In short, we do not know if or how education can disrupt the 
powerful influences reflected in the deception/ decision cycle. 
So, there is much to be learned through well-designed research 
on the impact of education (and different types of education) on in-
vestment decision making and susceptibility to fraud.174 This is true 
for every age cohort and especially true for older adults. 
The FINRA Investor Education Foundation is an obvious fund-
ing source for such research. The Foundation and its predecessor, the 
NASD Foundation, have already sponsored important research on in-
vestment fraud practices and the characteristics of investment fraud 
171. See Katherine Hall, Looking Beneath the Surface: The Impact of Psychology on 
Corporate Decision Making 49 MANAGERIAL L. 93, 94 (2007) (advocating training on 
cognitive biases for corporate directors); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' 
Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law & Economics' Equal Incom-
petence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 87-94 (2002) (noting the impact of corrective education on 
common cognitive biases). 
172. FINRA INvESTOR EDUC. FOUND., OVERCOMING BIASES TO PROMOTE WISE 
INVESTING 2 (2000), http:/ /www.finrafoundation.org/web/groups/foundation/ 
@foundation/documents/foundation/p118416.pdf. 
173. See Willis, supra note 141, at 201. 
174. A telling colloquy at the 2005 Senate Hearings on victimization of older 
investors suggests there has been little assessment of educational programs to 
date. See Old Scams-New Victims, supra note 23, at 33 (questions of Sen. Gordon 
Smith: "Do you do any research testing [these programs'] effectiveness? Do you 
have a sense you are reaching consumers? Is it getting through how they can pro-
tect themselves?" The answer stressed pretesting of materials, but not follow-up 
assessment. No one, apparently, has attempted to measure the success of these 
programs.). 
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victims/75 attitudes of older investors (fifty-five and older) about their 
own financial literacy and overall market competencer6 and the be-
havioral norms of this population with respect to brokers, investment 
advisers, and recommendations from friends. 177 It also has underwrit-
ten early research into the types of interventions that might actually 
help older adults make wiser investment choices!78 Other possible 
funders include the AARP Foundation,m the charitable giving units of 
brokerage firms/80 and foundations that fund programs in financial 
l . 181 1teracy. 
Whoever provides the funding, here are some of the questions 
that future researchers ought to seek to answer: 
• Are cautionary messages high in "sensation value" more ef-
fective for an older audience than informational messagesi82 
If so, what might these messages look like? 
• What media are most effective in educating older adults? 
• What kind of reinforcement is necessary to ensure that the 
cautionary message has been internalized and retained? How 
often, and through what media, should reinforcing messages 
be provided? 
175. INVESTOR FRAUD STIJDY, supra note 19, at 5. 
176. NASD INVESTOR EDUC. FOUND., SENlOR INVESTOR LITERACY AND FRAUD 
SUSCEPTIBILITY SURVEY, http:/ /www.saveandinvest.org/web/groups/sai/ 
documents/sai_original_content/p036699.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
177. See SaveAndlnvest.org, Key Findings of Older Investor Risk Survey, 
http:/ /www.saveandinvest.org/55Plus/Resources (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
178. See SaveAndlnvest.org, FINRA Investor Education Foundation, Investor 
Protection Campaign for Older Investors, http:/ /saveandinvest.org/55Plus/ 
About/Index.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
179. See AARP.org, AARP Foundation, http:/ /www.aarp.org/about_aarp/ 
aarp_foundation (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
180. See Merrill Lynch Global Philanthropy, http:/ /philanthropy.ml.com (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2009) . 
181. See Foundation for Financial Literacy, http:/ /www.ffliteracy.org (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2009). 
182. "Research in health communications .. . suggests that advertisements 
high in 'sensation value' (reflecting content that is novel, stimulating, graphic or 
explicit, among others) are more likely to increase viewers' attention, motivation to 
call a hotline, ad recall, and intentions to perform the target behavior, than those 
with lower sensation value." Lois Biener & T. M. Taylor, The Continuing Importance 
of Emotion in Tobacco Control Media Campaigns: A Response to Hastings and MacFa-
dyen, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL 75, 76 (2002). 
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• What role, if any, should banks play in the educational effort? 
Banks, after all, often provide the last clear chance for avoid-
ing unwise withdrawals or expenditures. (The same might be 
said for brokerage firms or pension funds.) Is today's fraud 
prevention message coming from the wrong messenger? 
• How can we measure the success of fraud prevention educa-
tional programs? 
As we explore these questions, we must remember a central, re-
curring law enforcement question. When confronted by widespread 
crime and given limited resources, should the state hire more police-
men, sanction offenders more harshly, or rely on preemptive victim 
education? In the next section of this Article, I cast my vote for more 
resources spent on policemen and harsher sanctions and less on crime 
prevention education. 
VII. Alternative Strategies 
Let us assume that the SEC, NASAA, AARP, and the many other 
providers of fraud prevention education for older adults are able to 
learn from the research suggested in this Article. Let us further as-
sume that they consolidate some of their efforts. How might some of 
the money now spent on fraud prevention education be reallocated? 
In this section, I will briefly examine five possibilities: increased crim-
inal prosecution for the perpetrators of securities fraud schemes tar-
geted at the elderly; increased sanctions for those who are found 
guilty; monitoring of securities fraud first offenders with a profile 
suggesting the likelihood of recidivism; development of noninvasive 
diagnostic tools to identify those older adults whose risk assessment 
capacity has been compromised; and more fraud prevention educa-
tion aimed at families. 
First, it is essential that the predators who engage in securities 
fraud schemes against older adults be caught and sanctioned appro-
priately. Putting aside the many perpetrators who are outside the 
United States and not easily apprehended, most securities fraud per-
petrators located in the United States are dealt with solely through the 
imposition of civil penalties, occupational bars, penny stock bars, and 
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"obey-the-law" injunctions.183 Because of priority attention now given 
to terrorism issues, the FBI and U.S. Attorneys' offices give little atten-
tion to the criminal prosecution of financial fraud, even big-dollar fi-
nancial fraud. 184 This is a mistake. Somehow, more resources must be 
allocated to the prosecution of financial frauds at the retail level. 
High-profile frauds like Enron and WorldCom or Bernie Madoff's 
Ponzi scheme unquestionably merit criminal prosecution, but so do 
the $50,000 or $100,000 securities frauds that deplete victims' retire-
ment accounts and also break their hearts.185 
Second, when defendants are convicted of securities fraud 
schemes, they should be sanctioned harshly. Currently, the primary 
factor in determining sentence length is the amount of the victim's fi-
nancialloss.186 While upward adjustment is allowed for the targeting 
of "vulnerable victims," including targeting victims who are vulnera-
ble because of their age,187 the upward adjustments currently allowed 
for "use of a special skill" or use of "sophisticated means" in orches-
trating one's crime may be inadequate to take into account the types 
of persuasive techniques employed and perfected by the most preda-
tory securities fraud defendants.188 
I have suggested elsewhere some additional holes in the sentenc-
ing system for economic crimes. For example, upward departures are 
now available for telemarketing schemes aimed at older adults but not 
183. See Barnard, supra note 22, at 192-93 (pointing out the inadequacies of ex-
isting civil remedies to deter securities fraud perpetrators, especially recidivists). 
184. See Dan Eggen & John Solomon, justice Department's Focus Has Shifted, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2007, at A1 (noting that, during the Bush administration, the 
Justice Department had retreated from prosecution of white collar crimes in favor 
of prosecution of immigration and terrorism-related offenses, as well as sex-
trafficking and obscenity prosecutions); Paul Shukovsky et al., The FBI's Terrorism 
Trade-off: Focus on National Security After 9/11 Means that the Agency Has Turned Its 
Back on Thousands of White Collar Crimes, SEATTLE POST-lNTELLIGENCER, Apr. 11, 
2007, http:/ /seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/311046_fbiterror11.html. 
185. See Jayne W. Barnard, Allocution for Victims of Economic Crimes, 77 NOTRE 
DAME L. REv. 39, 52-56 (2001) (detailing the devastating impact experienced by 
victims of financial frauds). 
186. Samuel W. Buell, Reforming Punishment of Financial Reporting Fraud, 28 
CARDOZO L. REv. 1611, 1619 (2007) (noting that "dollar loss is the dominant [sen-
tencing] factor"). 
187. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 3Al.l (2007). 
188. § 381.3 cmt. n.4 ("Special skill" refers to a skill not possessed by members 
of the general public and usually requires substantial education, training, or licens-
ing.); § 2B1.1(b)(8) cmt. n.7 ("Sophisticated means" requires especially complex or 
especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of 
the offense.). 
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for (increasingly common) Internet-based schemes.189 Also, there is 
currently no provision for an upward departure when a scheme in-
volves the depletion and reinvestment of a retirement accoune90 
Congress and the Sentencing Commission, respectively, should enact 
these provisions. 
Third, perpetrators of securities fraud schemes who exhibit a 
high likelihood of recidivism should be monitored after their first (or 
certainly their second) encounter with law enforcement, whether or 
not that encounter results in criminal prosecution. We do this already 
for sex offenders with a recidivism profile. 191 Con artists, or at least 
some con artists, deserve the same type of regulatory scrutiny.192 
Fourth, the government should support current efforts to identi-
fy the source of the risk assessment deficit identified in the Iowa stu-
dies. We have much to learn about where this deficit is located, how 
it operates, what biological or social factors may affect a person's risk 
assessment capacity, and how the risk assessment deficit may be re-
tarded or reversed. Perhaps most importantly, we need to identify 
some practical diagnostic tools that can help geriatricians identify 
which of their patients have, or are at risk for developing, a risk as-
sessment deficit. Only when that work is done can we tum our atten-
tion to behavioral or pharmaceutical treatments. 
Finally, we need to assist families in the care and oversight they 
provide for their elderly parents. 193 Families need to know more about 
the cognitive biases, marketing stimuli, psychological needs, and en-
vironmental circumstances that contribute to decisions to engage in 
unwise investing. They also must learn more about the decep-
tion/ decision cycle described in this Article, and become better edu-
cated (as it becomes possible to do so) about interventions that may be 
effective in interdicting their parents' bad investment choices. 
189. See Jayne W. Barnard, Creative Sanctions for Online Investment Fraud, 76 
MISS. L.J. 949, 970 (2007). 
190. I d. at 970-71. 
191. See Barnard, supra note 22, at 224-25. 
192. See id. for further discussion of the monitoring proposal. 
193. A modest beginning may be found in the NASAA podcast, "Talking to 
Your Parents About Senior Investment Fraud," http:/ /www.nasaa.org/nasaa_ 
newsroom/6434.cfm (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
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VIII. Conclusion 
Older adults today are disproportionately the victims of all sorts 
of frauds, not just securities frauds. The AARP warns that "people 
over age 60 make up only one-eighth of the U.S. population, yet they 
constitute one of every three scam victims."194 
The victimization of older adults is due, in part, to the fact that 
they control a lot of money.195 It is also due to the neurobiological, 
psychosocial, and environmental factors identified and discussed in 
this Article. 
Is fraud prevention education the answer to this problem? Or, is 
it really a project that feels good but offers little likelihood of altering 
older adults' decision-making behavior? This Artide offers no easy 
answer. It does, however, suggest a research agenda that would pro-
vide a sound basis for educational intervention. Alternatively, it sug-
gests that some or all of the factors that play a role in fraud victimiza-
tion may be impervious to educational intervention. 
194. Kirchheimer, supra note 12. 
195. See Protecting Senior Citizens, supra note 3, at 2 ("Households led by people 
over 40 already own 91 percent of America's net worth .... ");PROTECTING SENIOR 
INVESTORS, supra note 14, at 2 ("75% of the nation's consumer financial assets, va-
lued at $16 trillion, are held by households headed by someone who is 50 or old-
er."). 
